Weak Coffee: Certification and Co-Optation in the Fair Trade Movement by Jaffee, Daniel
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Sociology Faculty Publications and 
Presentations Sociology 
2-1-2012 
Weak Coffee: Certification and Co-Optation in the 
Fair Trade Movement 
Daniel Jaffee 
Portland State University, jaffee@pdx.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/soc_fac 
 Part of the Food Studies Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Citation Details 
Jaffee, Daniel, "Weak Coffee: Certification and Co-Optation in the Fair Trade Movement" (2012). Sociology 
Faculty Publications and Presentations. 130. 
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/soc_fac/130 
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please 
contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
WEAK COFFEE: CERTIFICATION AND COOPTATION IN THE  
FAIR TRADE MOVEMENT 
 
Daniel Jaffee1 
 
 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the journal Social Problems on 
February 1, 2012.  Available online: https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2012.59.1.94 
 
 
Citation:  Daniel Jaffee.  2012. “Weak Coffee: Certification and Co-optation in the Fair Trade 
Movement.”  Social Problems 59 (1): 94-116.  Doi: 10.1525/sp.2012.59.1.94 
 
 
 
Abstract:  The sociological literature on social movement organizations (SMOs) has come to 
recognize that under neoliberal globalization many SMOs have moved from an emphasis on the 
state as the locus of change toward a focus on corporations as targets. This shift has led some 
SMOs to turn to forms of market-based private regulatory action. The use of one such tactic—
voluntary, third-party product certification—has grown substantially, as SMOs seek ways to hold 
stateless firms accountable. This article explores the case of the international fair trade 
movement, which aims to change the inequitable terms of global trade in commodities for small 
farmers, artisans, and waged laborers. Drawing from interviews with a range of fair trade 
participants, document analysis, and media coverage, the article describes fair trade's growing 
relationship with multinational coffee firms, particularly Starbucks and Nestlé. It explores intra-
movement conflicts over the terms for and the effects of corporate participation in fair trade, and 
illuminates tensions between conceptualizations of fair trade as movement, market, and system. 
The article makes two arguments. First, while fair trade has succeeded partially in reembedding 
market exchange within systems of social and moral relations, it has also proved susceptible to 
the power of corporate actors to disembed the alternative through a process of movement co-
optation. Second, it argues that co-optation takes a unique form in the context of social 
movements whose principal tools to achieve social change are certification and labeling: it 
occurs primarily on the terrain of standards, in the form of weakening or dilution. 
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How much difference does a decade make for a social movement?  In April 2000, stung 
by charges of labor rights violations on its Central American coffee plantations and facing a 
threat of large-scale protests and a boycott by the human rights organization Global Exchange 
and other groups, Starbucks—the largest specialty coffee roaster—capitulated to activist 
demands (James 2000).  The company agreed to sell fair-trade certified coffee at all 2,300 of its 
U.S. cafes, albeit initially purchasing less than one percent of its overall supply (Starbucks 2001). 
By 2009, Starbucks—which had since mushroomed to 11,000 stores in the U.S. alone—was 
purchasing 39 million pounds of fair-trade coffee, over 10 percent of its total volume (Starbucks 
2010).  Moreover, several of the firm’s competitors had followed suit, including the world’s 
largest coffee trader, Nestlé.  By all appearances, this was a remarkably successful case of a 
social movement mobilizing consumer pressure and market tactics to hold a major transnational 
corporation accountable for the social effects of its commercial practices.  Yet these 
developments have also proved quite controversial.  The U.S. fair trade movement has over the 
past decade experienced increasingly serious divisions, centered precisely on the nature of its 
relationship to the large firms that have contributed to the dramatic growth of fair trade sales.  
The sociological literature on social movement organizations (SMOs) has recognized that 
over the past two decades, many SMOs have shifted from a nearly exclusive emphasis on the 
state as a locus of change toward a focus on corporations as targets (Pellow 2001; Van Dyke, 
Soule, and Taylor 2004). This shift has been accompanied by the rise of corporate campaigning 
tactics, such as those employed by the movement against genetically engineered foods 
(Schurman 2004, 2010; Weber, Thomas, and Rao 2009), anti-sweatshop movements (Klein 
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1999; Seidman 2007), campaigns targeted at specific corporations’ contribution to climate 
change (Trumpy 2008), and movements against tropical deforestation (Bartley 2007a; Klooster 
2005).  This phenomenon is typically framed as an artifact both of a neoliberal turn away from 
strong state regulation, and of processes of economic globalization that have extended the scale 
of economic activity in many cases beyond the reach of national governments, with transnational 
corporations wielding greatly increased power relative to states (McMichael 2007).  The new 
reality has also been marked by the rise of new forms of private regulation and suprastate 
governance (Busch and Bain 2004; Mutersbaugh 2005b).  The use of one such form of market-
based nonstate regulation—voluntary product certification—has grown substantially in recent 
years, as social movements seek ways to hold increasingly mobile or stateless firms accountable.   
Yet how should one theorize a social movement that aims to transform the social 
conditions of production across global industries, but, rather than pushing firms to change their 
behavior with campaigning tactics, utilizes voluntary certification as its primary tool, in an effort 
to simultaneously recruit and regulate powerful economic actors?  And how ought we to 
understand the ways in which capital responds to such initiatives that aim to tame the excesses of 
unregulated markets through the workings of the market (Brown 1993)—responses that may 
instead have the effect of taming the social movement itself?  
This article explores the case of the international fair trade movement, a coalition 
comprised of a broad range of activists, traders, retailers, producer organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), certifiers and consumers in more than 70 countries.  
Historically, the movement’s central premises have been commitments to guaranteed minimum 
commodity prices to address volatile terms of trade, pre-harvest payment for structurally 
disadvantaged small farmers and artisans, the development of long-term trading relationships, 
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and transparency undergirded by independent third-party certification.  Coffee was the first fair 
trade commodity, and while the system has since expanded to a wide variety of other products, it 
continues to be the most important in terms of volume and sales. 
I make two principal arguments in this article.  First, while fair trade has succeeded 
partially in “re-embedding” market exchange within systems of social and moral relations, it has 
also proved susceptible to the power of corporate actors who have sought to disembed the 
alternative through an increasingly successful process of cooptation.  Second, I argue that such 
cooptation takes a unique form in the context of a social movement whose principal tools to 
achieve social change are certification and labeling: it occurs primarily on the terrain of 
standards, in the form of weakening or dilution.   
Drawing from an extensive set of interviews with a range of players in the fair trade 
movement and market over the course of nine years (2001-2010), as well as document analysis 
and media coverage, this article describes fair trade’s growing interaction with large mainstream 
trading and retailing firms over the movement’s nearly 25-year history.  I explore the intra-
movement tensions that have emerged over questions of tactics and strategy, particularly over the 
terms for and the effects of corporate participation.  I also examine the case of transnational 
firms’ involvement in the fair trade coffee market, focusing on two specific companies: the 
specialty-coffee giant Starbucks and the world’s largest coffee trader, Nestlé.    
In the following section, this article ties together several bodies of scholarship to gain 
theoretical purchase on the case of fair trade.  I explore the influential notion of market 
embeddedness developed by Karl Polanyi (1944), bringing it together with both the social 
movements literature examining corporate campaigns and cooptation, and an interdisciplinary 
body of scholarship on certification, standards, private regulation, and the political economy of 
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global commodity chains.  A brief third section describes my research methods and data.  The 
fourth part of the article focuses on the fair trade movement and market, charting their growth 
from a marginal, alternative civil society initiative in the late 1980s to an international 
certification system with sales of $5 billion that has enrolled some of the largest transnational 
food traders and retailers (FLO 2009).  Throughout, I utilize the concept of cooptation—a key 
analytic used by social movement scholars to understand the responses by states, as well as 
corporations, to social movement activity (Campbell 2001; Gamson 1968, 1975; Trumpy 
2008)—to assess charges by movement activists that large firms have diluted fair trade standards 
and have used their often negligible participation to engage in “fair-washing” (Renard 2005).  A 
fifth section steps back to assess the implications of this case study for social movement theory 
and for fair trade organizations, followed by some concluding observations. 
Perspectives on Movements and Markets 
 
Market Embeddedness  
 As neoliberal globalization has altered the balance of power between states, citizens, and 
capital by giving primacy to markets, many social scientists have found analytic utility in Karl 
Polanyi’s (1944) historical critique of the “self-regulating” market.  The advent of the market 
economy that accompanied the industrial revolution, argued Polanyi, led the production of goods 
to become “disembedded” from the systems of social and moral relations in which they had 
hitherto been grounded.  The dire social and ecological consequences of this disembedding led 
eventually to the rise of “movements of self-protection” against the tyranny of the market, 
resulting in “a network of measures and policies [that] was integrated into powerful institutions 
designed to check the action of the market… [A] deep-seated movement sprang into being to 
resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy” (1944: 76).  The gains of this 
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movement took concrete form in the 20th century in welfare-state policies and in the increased 
regulation of capital.  Ironically, it is the demise of this state-based regulatory project in the 
neoliberal era that has contributed to the recent resurgence of interest in Polanyi’s work (Benería 
1999; Block 1990; Guthman 2007; Turner 2007). 
Several observers of fair trade have used this framework to examine the nature of the 
challenge that it poses to the dominant global market, evaluating fair trade’s potential to “re-
embed” economic transactions in social relations (Fridell 2007b; Hudson and Hudson 2004; 
Jaffee 2007; Mutersbaugh 2005a; Raynolds 2000).  Others characterize fair trade as a 
countermovement along the lines described by Polanyi (e.g., Fridell, Hudson, and Hudson 2008).  
However, the utility of this approach is complicated by the changing degree of embeddedness of 
the fair trade system.  Analyzing the fair trade movement’s complex and evolving relationship 
with corporate participants necessitates an examination of the dynamics of social movements that 
target corporations.  
Changing Targets and Tactics   
The sociological literature on social movements has over the last 15 years come to 
acknowledge that many SMOs no longer focus primarily, or even at all, on the state as the locus 
of their efforts to achieve social change (Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004).  This shift is based 
on the recognition that in a neoliberal context, it is increasingly corporations, rather than the 
state, that are the dominant political and economic organizations in society.  Several authors have 
argued that at least since the 1970’s a combination of forces has challenged the power of national 
and local governments to regulate capital, including deindustrialization, economic globalization, 
and a new global trade regime, embodied in trade and investment agreements such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and supra-state bodies including the World Trade Organization 
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(WTO) and more recently the G-20 (e.g., Harvey 2005; McMichael 1996).  Pellow argues in an 
influential piece (2001: 47) that “the state’s policy-making authority has weakened as 
corporations have become both policy makers and the new targets of challengers.”1  These 
phenomena have caused a shift in the sociological literature on political opportunity structures.  
Since its appearance in the 1980s, this approach has emphasized the influence of exogenous 
factors—particularly the character of state institutions—on the effectiveness of social 
movements in achieving their demands, rather than stressing primarily internal dynamics (e.g., 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).   However, the extension of neoliberalism has increasingly 
pushed scholarship on political opportunity structures away from a focus on the nature of 
governmental bodies and public policy, and toward a concern with characteristics and behaviors 
of both individual corporations and of industries, what Schurman (2004) refers to as industry 
structures.  These structures, she argues, “are a critical determinant of movement efficacy when 
the primary target of opposition is corporations, rather than the state” (2004: 245).  Concomitant 
with these changes in the targets of social movement contestation has been the development of a 
new repertoire of tactics, many of which can be subsumed under the broad rubric of the 
“corporate campaign.”  Trumpy (2008), for example, examines a largely successful campaign by 
the environmental organization Greenpeace against Coca-Cola, using the corporation’s 
participation in the Olympics to force it to take action to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.  
Schurman (2004; 2010) charts the rise of the international movement against genetically-
modified foods, linking its substantial success to astute campaigning strategies against high-
profile corporations such as Monsanto.  Seidman (2007) and Collins (2003), among others, trace 
the efforts by organized labor and human rights activists to take on stateless apparel firms with 
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transnational organizing tactics, including independent monitoring of corporate codes of conduct 
in the subcontracted factories that make their branded clothes.   
Although the increased focus on the characteristics of corporate firms and the tactics of 
social movements that target them is an important development, two dimensions directly related 
to industry structures have made only limited appearance in the literature on social movements.  
These elements can help to determine both the opportunities and the most effective tactics 
available to social change advocates, whether they are labor organizers in the global South or fair 
trade activists in the North.  The first of these factors is the advent of product certification and 
labeling, a form of nonstate regulation which is increasingly being deployed by movements 
attempting to hold large firms accountable for the social and environmental effects of their 
practices, as well as by private industry and suprastate actors.  The second dimension is the 
nature of the commodity chains that global firms utilize to harvest, produce, process, assemble, 
transport, package, and retail their products.  Below I apply some of the key insights of the 
scholarship on private regulation, certification, and global commodity chains to the issue of the 
changing structure of opportunity for SMOs that focus on global corporations. 
Private Regulation, Standards, Certification, and Global Commodity Chains  
 A broad range of scholars has charted the epochal changes generated by economic 
globalization (e.g., Harvey 2005; McMichael 1996; Sklair 2002).  One of the subthemes of this 
literature is the rise of private governance, of which standards and certification are one 
manifestation.  Busch and Bain (2004) discuss the growth of private standards, especially those 
created by retailing firms, which they claim now play a more significant role than either states or 
suprastate bodies such as the WTO in regulating and restructuring global markets.  This move 
from public to private regulation parallels the retreat of the state from the regulation of markets 
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under neoliberalism more generally.  In terms of the organization of capitalist accumulation, it 
forms part of a broader shift from Fordism to “flexible accumulation” (Friedland 1994; 
Goodman and Watts 1994; McMichael 2007).  Concomitant with all of these shifts are 
fundamental changes in the nature of the commodity chains for food and other products.    
In this context, some observers argue that certification has emerged as a more politically 
palatable alternative to state regulation—a form Bartley characterizes as a distinct “mode of 
social regulation” (Forthcoming: 1).  Certification responds to a range of imperatives from 
different actors, including consumers, who increasingly want reliable information regarding the 
attributes of products, and social movements, which “demand standards that can somehow 
regulate global supply chains” (Bartley Forthcoming: 9).  Thus, the rise of private certification in 
the neoliberal era can be read as a response to “pressures to re-embed markets in social relations 
that have typically generated state regulation” (ibid.: 9)  On the other hand, certification also 
responds to global firms’ needs to rationalize far-flung production networks, protect their brands, 
and compete in the arena of corporate social responsibility.  Bartley (2007b: 310) observes that 
the rules and “cultural scripts” of neoliberalism facilitate the rise of private regulation, as states 
are increasingly unable or unwilling to use formal regulatory power to control environmental and 
labor practices, particularly those of transnational firms.  Therefore it is not surprising that most 
certification systems have been created by social movements or by NGOs, which he describes as 
“institutional entrepreneurs” in this arena.   
 The functioning of product certification has been conceptualized in various ways.  
According to Renard (2005), certification’s power rests upon its ability to define not only 
specific qualities of goods or the social conditions they embody (e.g., production processes, labor 
conditions, or trading practices), but also to define which products do not meet such definitions.  
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Such acts of delineation, she writes, “constitute, in effect, mechanisms of market entry and 
exclusion, converting them into a source of power for those who control them” (2005: 425).   
 The value claims that undergird product certifications are communicated to consumers 
primarily through labels or seals, and observers differ widely in their assessment of the 
limitations and possibilities of such markers.  Barham (2002: 350) describes values-based 
labeling as a “manifestation of social resistance to the violation of broadly shared values” by the 
capitalist marketplace.  Guthman, on the other hand, charges that voluntary product labels are 
“typical of neoliberal regulation” because they shift regulatory responsibility from the state to 
consumers: “not only do these labels concede the market as the locus of regulation … but they 
employ tools designed to create markets” where none previously existed (2007: 457).   
Yet there is a wide variety of product certifications currently in the marketplace, and to 
characterize them all as “neoliberal regulation” elides important distinctions between initiatives.  
First-party certifications are typically corporate self-policing systems with no intermediary 
involved (examples in the coffee sector include Starbucks’ own “Café Practices” system, and 
“direct trade” claims made by various specialty roasters).  Second-party certifications are usually 
created by an industry segment or association, rather than individual firms, but do not constitute 
independent verification.  Third-party certifications are conducted, at least ostensibly, by 
independent, neutral bodies that engage in auditing and maintain a rigorous chain of custody to 
verify claims made by the firms they certify (fair trade certification and the Rainforest Alliance 
seal are both third-party systems).   
A few high-profile cases of certification have received the bulk of academic attention.  A 
coalition of social movements, NGOs, firms, and foundations created the Forest Stewardship 
Council in the 1990s in an effort to curb tropical deforestation (Bartley 2007a; Gulbrandsen 
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2004; Klooster 2005; Taylor 2005b).  Following widespread public outcry in the U.S. over 
sweatshop labor conditions in global apparel factories, leading firms were pushed to adopt 
voluntary codes of conduct.  The Clinton administration worked with NGOs and firms to create 
the Fair Labor Association certification, and labor groups have engaged in independent labor 
monitoring to hold corporations accountable to their promises (Bartley 2007b; Collins 2003; 
Seidman 2008).  Other initiatives are focused on the arena of agriculture and food (hitherto 
“agrifood”).  Organic agriculture was the earliest of the current generation of certifications, and 
has generated a substantial body of literature (Allen and Kovach 2000; Guthman 2004; Rigby 
and Brown 2007).  The Marine Stewardship Council was created to certify sustainably-caught 
seafood.  Finally, the international fair trade system has drawn substantial scholarly attention as 
one of the earliest and largest certification schemes, as I discuss in the following section.  In each 
of these cases—with the exception of organics2—the third-party civil society initiative was 
eventually challenged by a newer, industry-sponsored, competing first- or second-party system.   
If private standards, certification, and labeling are increasingly an important means of 
communicating claims regarding social and environmental conditions of production to 
consumers—whether based on civil society concerns for justice and sustainability, or on firms’ 
desire for brand differentiation—then attention to the nature of the global production networks 
behind these goods is necessary.  A substantial interdisciplinary body of literature, pioneered by 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), examines the political economy of global commodity chains.  
The global commodity chain framework has been used extensively by scholars in the political 
economy of world-systems school, particularly those focusing on commodity chains in the 
agrifood arena (e.g., Friedmann 1994; McMichael 2000, 2007).  One central focus of this work 
has been the nature of the restructuring of commodity chains under neoliberal or post-Fordist 
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economic globalization.  The key transformation in this arena has been the ongoing shift from 
“producer-driven” chains controlled by large production firms and characterized by mass-market 
products and vertical control, to “buyer-driven” chains in which quality is a key attribute, 
products are highly differentiated, and distributors or retailers (such as supermarket chains) are 
able to control producers, impose conditions, and capture an increasing share of value.   
Additional work has contributed to further refining the typology of commodity chains.   
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) distinguish between “captive” chains, in which 
producers are tightly controlled by processors and/or retailers, and “relational” commodity 
chains, in which transactions are based on longer-term commercial relationships and the sharing 
of power and information across a network (Raynolds and Wilkinson 2007).  The fair trade 
system is also premised on shortening the value chain by removing many intermediaries.  The 
objective of the fair trade model at the outset was thus to create truly alternative commodity 
chains that would be both shorter and more relational—thereby freeing up capital to be 
redistributed to farmers in the form of a higher, fairer price, and forging more direct links 
between producers and consumers (Raynolds 2002; Raynolds 2000).  Yet as I describe later, the 
involvement of large corporate firms in the fair trade market has led to the certification of 
precisely the kind of longer, captive chains which the system was formed to counteract (Fridell 
2007b; Renard 2003).  The inclusion of these two fundamentally opposed types of economic 
exchange under a single seal has in turn set the stage for cooptation within fair trade.   
Cooptation    
The literature on social movement cooptation has traditionally viewed the state not only 
as the primary target of movement contestation, but as the agent of cooptation.  Selznick’s work 
(1948: 34) defined cooptation as “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or 
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policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting a threat to its stability or 
existence.”  Gamson (1975) framed cooptation as an outcome in which a social movement or 
minority group becomes accepted by or is incorporated into the state apparatus (access), but does 
not achieve meaningful policy gains (new advantages).   
This section poses two questions regarding cooptation.  Is it appropriate to apply this 
concept—historically grounded in the study of movements aiming to change state policy and 
law—to a context in which corporations, and not the state, are the targets of social movement 
activism?   And if so, how should cooptation be conceptualized in the case of groups whose 
challenges take place not in the form of corporate campaigning, but on the more narrow terrain 
of market-based strategies, specifically product certification? 
Scholars have increasingly answered the first question in the affirmative, calling attention 
to the shift away from strong state regulation under neoliberalism, and the need for social 
movements to target corporations directly (Pellow 2001).3  Trumpy defines cooptation in this 
context as “a corporate target’s ability to maintain SMO support without acquiescing to SMO 
demands” (2008: 480).  Thompson and Coskuner-Balli (2007) examine the organic food 
movement in the U.S., arguing that its increasing corporatization is a form of cooptation.   
Trumpy’s (2008) study of the campaign by the environmental group Greenpeace against 
Coca-Cola sheds useful light on these processes.  In examining the effect of Greenpeace’s efforts 
to force Coke to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change, she 
distinguishes between three different possible outcomes: corporate reform, co-optation, and 
compromise, characterizing the outcome of that campaign as the latter.  She highlights the 
dilemma confronting social movements that choose to adopt institutional strategies and tactics, 
which, in Gamson’s terms, stress acceptance over new advantages.  “Overemphasizing 
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acceptance,” writes Trumpy, “distracts the SMO from its ultimate goals, such as changing 
corporate policies and actions … movement actors are less likely to engage in protest that 
directly challenges a target’s legitimacy or use other strategies that may counter cooptation by 
targets” (2008: 483).  The “mainstreaming” strategy adopted by key leaders in the fair trade 
movement since 2000—a choice to reach mass-market consumers by pursuing and certifying 
large corporate firms—is an example of such institutionalization.   
The second question I posed above—how to understand cooptation within movements 
whose primary strategies and tactics involve market tools such as certification—has been far less 
well studied, although some scholars of certification provide the beginning of a response.   
Bartley writes that “engagement with certification may also carry dangers of co-optation and de-
radicalization” (Forthcoming: 16).  He asserts that the development of Forest Stewardship 
Council certification resulted in major changes within the movement against tropical 
deforestation, shifting its primary focus away from protest and boycott tactics.  Scholars studying 
the organic and sustainable agriculture movements (Allen and Kovach 2000; Campbell 2001; 
Guthman 2004; Howard 2009) have charted the progressive simplification and harmonization of 
organic food certification.  Observers of anti-sweatshop movements have explored how the 
advent of corporate codes of conduct defused some of their radical potential (Fung, O'Rourke, 
and Sabel 2001; Klein 1999; Seidman 2008).  Yet the latter case notwithstanding, competing 
(and typically lower-bar) corporate certifications and/or standards almost always appear after 
civil society-led initiatives are established.  “Corporations,"	writes	Bartley	(2007b:	340),	"are	more	likely	to	coopt	forms	created	by	others	than	to	create	them	de	novo."			
Several sociologists examining the fair trade movement have suggested that the 
involvement of corporations holds the possibility of cooptation.  Fridell, Hudson, and Hudson 
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(2008) analyze what they term a “countermobilization” by the four largest coffee firms in 
response to the challenge posed by fair trade, applying Gamson’s (1975) framework of 
movement outcomes.  They conclude that the transnational firms’ dominant approach has been to 
delegitimize fair trade, and that the outcome so far falls between “preemption” and movement 
“collapse.”  Jaffee (2007; 2010) considers the potential for manipulation and cooptation of fair 
trade’s core principles by large corporate entrants.  Fridell (2007b: 287) explores the conundrum 
posed by corporate involvement, concluding that it risks “sacrificing the long-term feasibility of 
the movement for short-term gain.”  However, while this social science literature on fair trade 
has to varying degrees broached the topic of cooptation, it has yet to develop the concept as a 
central theme, to ground it in close empirical scrutiny of trends within fair trade, to tie it 
explicitly to the issue of standards, or to engage more substantively with the scholarly literature 
on social movement outcomes.    
This piece extends upon the above contributions in several ways.  It examines cooptation 
in fair trade as a central focus, drawing on both the literature on social movement outcomes and 
scholarship on private regulation and global commodity chains to compare fair trade with the 
aforementioned cases of cooptation in SMOs that have engaged corporate actors.  It analyzes the 
phenomenon of cooptation through a close examination of the fair trade movement’s historical 
trajectory, in particular the evolution of its relationship with corporate agrifood firms over the 
past decade, and the effect of that relationship on the policy choices made by key movement 
actors.  Finally, this article makes two specific contributions regarding the nature of cooptation in 
social movements that engage with corporations primarily through labeling and certification.  I 
argue that the most significant feature of cooptation for these movements is that it takes place 
specifically on the terrain of the standards underlying the certification itself.  More specifically, 
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the process of standards-related cooptation is best viewed through the lens of standards dilution 
or weakening.  In my discussion below of the case study of the fair trade movement, I describe 
how the dilution of fair trade standards has generated substantial intra-movement conflict and 
has led to a significant degree of movement cooptation.   
Data and Methods    
 
 This research project was designed as an extended ethnographic case study (Burawoy 
1991).  The data on which the analysis is based are drawn primarily from semi-structured 
interviews, and supplemented by three additional sources.  I conducted interviews with a wide 
range of actors in the fair trade movement and market between 2001 and 2010, a period which 
encompasses nearly all of the history of certified fair trade in the U.S. and the most rapid growth 
of fair trade on an international level, as well as the entirety of the movement’s engagement with 
transnational firms.  During this time I attended many of the key conferences and fora on fair 
trade held in the U.S. and internationally.  The interview respondents include the leaders, 
directors, board, staff and members of fair trade and allied NGOs, international certifiers and 
national fair trade licensing bodies located in the U.S., Europe, and Latin America, large and 
small coffee roasters and other firms, activist groups, and fair trade producer organizations, as 
well as researchers studying fair trade.  Table 1 provides a breakdown of the respondents by 
organizational categories.  I conducted interviews with 39 respondents; 35 were conducted in 
person and four by telephone.  Of the 35 respondents representing fair trade organizations or 
retail firms, 23 were current or former directors and/or founders, and 12 were staff.  Thirty of the 
interview subjects were male, and nine were female.  The interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
and three hours, and were audio recorded.  I initially assembled a core list of respondents from a 
small number of key informants; once interviews had begun I expanded the list through snowball  
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Table 1:  Categories and Organizations Represented by Interview Respondents 
 
Category/Organization 
 
Number of Respondents 
Certifiers   (3)  
        Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO)* 
        Certimex 
 
 
2 
1 
Licensing Initiatives   (5)   
        Transfair USA** 
        Fairtrade Foundation (UK)  
        Comercio Justo México 
 
 
2 
1 
2 
Fair Trade Retailers  (9)    
        Coffee firms/roasters 
        Other firms 
 
 
7 
2 
 
NGO Staff/Representatives  (13)   
         US 
         UK 
         Netherlands  
         Mexico  
         
 
6 
2 
1 
4 
 
Producer/Farmer Organization Representatives 
 
6 
 
Fair Trade Researchers  
 
4 
 
 
NOTE:  All respondents (with the exception of researchers) are current or former directors, founders and/or 
staff of their respective organizations.  The table does not sum exactly to the number of respondents (N=39) 
because one respondent had two overlapping roles.  
*Name changed to Fair Trade International in 2010. 
**Name changed to Fair Trade USA in 2010. 
 
 
sampling.  While not random, this sample is broadly representative of the range of key actors and 
perspectives within the fair trade movement and system.  The interviews were conducted 
primarily at fair trade meetings and conferences, as well as in other locations arranged with 
respondents.  While I quote only from a subset of the interviews in this article for reasons of 
length, the remainder of the interview data strongly inform the broader analysis.  The choice of  
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which interview respondents to include directly in the article was made with the aim of 
representing the founders, leaders, and staff of the key organizations that have been most 
influential in the national and international debates within the fair trade movement and system.  
The interviews were transcribed and coded to identify themes that emerged through analysis, and 
which later guided the organization of the article.  These themes included the movement’s 
history and founding principles; the relationship between certifiers and corporate firms; the 
effects of fair trade’s growth, minimum price levels, and plantation production on standards and 
small producers; the role of different groups of fair trade retail firms; governance of fair trade 
institutions; and divergent understandings of the fair trade movement, market, and system. 
 The interviews were supplemented with comments and papers delivered by a range of 
fair trade actors at public meetings and conferences.  I also made extensive use of media 
coverage of fair trade throughout the same period, taken from newspapers, magazines, and web 
sources.  Finally, I drew on documents including annual reports, press releases, position 
statements and reports from certifiers, firms, NGOs, international institutions, and other sources.    
Trajectory of the Fair Trade Movement    
 
The fair trade movement emerged out of two distinct currents during the postwar period 
in both the U.S. and Europe (Jaffee 2007).  One strand was rooted in liberal development groups 
and religious charities, such as Oxfam in the UK and SERRV in the U.S., which were focused on 
generating markets for the handicraft products of impoverished people and refugees through 
networks of “world shops.”  Another set of antecedents came from more radical solidarity 
activists and NGOs, who were oriented toward supporting grassroots movements in the Third 
World and particularly socialist states (Renard 1999a; Tiffen 2005).  The multiple threads of this 
budding “alternative trade” movement slowly came together during the 1960s and 1970s, but not 
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until the 1980s did the outlines of the current form of fair trade emerge.  A co-founder of the first 
U.S. fair trade coffee roaster, Equal Exchange, described the company’s original vision: 
We started meeting and talking about setting up a business…inspired by the Nicaraguan 
revolution, inspired by other development movements around the world…So we 
imported coffee from this group in Holland, and began selling to food coops and 
solidarity groups.  This is at the height of the Nicaraguan solidarity movement, 1985.  
…So that was really the origins, and we had never intended to be a coffee company—we 
thought we’d have a wide range of foods.  And the original idea was really working with 
the social movements. (Rosenthal 2005) 
 
A few years later, in 1988, came the step that established fair trade in its present form.  The 
Dutch development NGO Solidaridad formed a partnership with the UCIRI indigenous coffee 
cooperative in Oaxaca, Mexico, with the goal of developing a bigger and more remunerative 
market for UCIRI’s coffee. Solidaridad created a label—Max Havelaar—that could be affixed to 
any brand that met its criteria for fairness (Renard 1999b).  These criteria were fourfold: payment 
of a firm floor or base price representing a “fair wage” for smallholders; pre-payment or credit to 
farmers in advance of the harvest, to avoid indebtedness; an additional premium payment to be 
used for social development projects; and long-term trading relationships with democratically-
organized producer cooperatives or associations.  As many alternative trade organizations and 
some smaller conventional roasters began using the Max Havelaar seal, the system slowly 
expanded to other nations, and eventually beyond coffee to other export crops, initially cocoa, 
bananas and tea.  The structure was fairly simple: national licensing initiatives in each consumer 
country certified producer organizations to sell fair-trade products, and licensed firms that met 
fair trade criteria to use the seal on the products they purchased from those organized farmers.   
However, as fair trade grew throughout the 1990s, with licensing bodies eventually 
established in 17 European nations, this challenge to the conventional market underwent a 
gradual deradicalization.  This was due in part to tensions present within fair trade’s left-liberal 
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coalition from the outset (helping to set the stage for cooptation), partly to the professionalization 
of fair trade organizations, and also in part to the adoption of a more formal, international 
certification model.  A pioneering fair trade activist in the U.K. described these dynamics:  
When Max Havelaar started, they were so connected and so motivated by what producers 
had to say, it was in the genes.  It was in the DNA of the structure. … [But] by the time it 
becomes a Euro-wide thing, that voice is being lost, because not everybody had that same 
ethos.  But I think the more pernicious part of the story was the new wave of certification 
folks that were coming in at that time…with that came the notion that the closer you are 
to your beneficiaries, the less credible your mark is. …So oddly enough, the growing-out-
of-adolescence-into-adulthood of this movement started to inject an argument or a logic 
that was the antithesis of what this was all for. (Tiffen 2005)      
 
In 1997, faced with rapid growth, all of the European licensing initiatives created an international 
body to homogenize standards and administer certification: Fairtrade Labeling Organizations 
International (FLO), based in Bonn, Germany.  Formal certification arrived in the United States 
fully a decade later than in Europe, and it quickly marked a major departure from the model 
developed there.  The first U.S. fair-trade certified coffee was sold in 1998.  While the new 
certification body, Transfair USA,4 was originally housed at the Institute for Agriculture and 
Trade Policy (IATP), a progressive Minneapolis-based think tank, it became independent in 1999 
with substantial seed funding from the Ford Foundation, and moved to Oakland, California.  
Figure 1 shows the growth of fair trade coffee sales in the U.S., along with key events in the 
movement’s history, which are described in greater detail below. 
Transfair USA joined FLO and quickly adopted a concerted “mainstreaming” strategy to 
increase the volume of fair trade sales through conventional retail venues and under existing 
commercial brands, as opposed to the alternative trade groups that had dominated fair trade thus 
far.  A founder of Equal Exchange coffee described this shift, which would prove to be a 
watershed in fair trade’s development: 
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What the fair trade labeling did is it took something that was a complete[ly] alternative 
economic chain called alternative trade—from producer all the way to the end 
consumer—and said, “well, in order to increase volume here, we’re going to let go of the 
supply chain past the port of export, and as long as people source in this fair trade 
manner, we don’t care what happens on this second half of the chain.”  And so, 
obviously, that opened it up to Starbucks, Green Mountain and anybody else who was 
willing to source according to that criteria.  And so, volume has increased tenfold because 
of that, which is a tremendous accomplishment.  (Rosenthal 2005) 
 
Figure 1:  U.S. Fair Trade Certified Coffee Sales and Key Events in Fair Trade  
Movement and Market, 1986-2011 
 
 
 While the certification structure in the U.S. officially resembles that of the European 
licensing bodies, Transfair’s relationship to the social movements from which it emerged is 
notably different.  The European initiatives include formal representation from trade unions, 
development NGOs, and other groups.  However, according to the Vice-Chair of FLO,  
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There is a huge difference between Transfair USA’s policies and the rest of the 
movement… I don’t fully understand the Transfair USA model because it’s not a  
membership, it doesn’t have organizations belonging to it, so its own board decides who 
would be on there, and I think it’s a relatively narrow spread of people, and views. And I 
can say for the discussion here, conservatively, that it lacks legitimacy. (Bretman 2010) 
 
This lack of representation by social movements in the governance of Transfair would become a 
point of conflict shortly after it began to license companies to use the fair trade seal in the U.S., 
among the first of which was the specialty-coffee giant Starbucks.   
 Participants within the international fair trade movement hold a range of different 
perspectives regarding fair trade’s role and the nature of the challenge it poses to conventional 
trade: a mechanism to access markets for disadvantaged producers, a tool to leverage corporate 
reform, or a vehicle for a more fundamental transformation of global trade (Jaffee 2007).  Yet 
within the movement coalition, these philosophical and strategic distinctions were for many 
years largely ignored or blurred over, generating what Dorward (1974: 477) terms a “working 
misunderstanding,” in which the parties simultaneously operate under distinct, even incompatible 
“conceptual models which had proven meaningful under quite different circumstances.”  This 
misunderstanding, as I describe later, extends to the semantic conflation of fair trade certification 
and licensing bodies with the social movement from which they emerged.   
Fair Trade Coffee: Transnational Firms and Intra-Movement Dynamics  
 
 Fair trade was founded during an era of regulated coffee trade, under the International 
Coffee Agreement quota system that had functioned as a price and supply stabilizer since the 
early 1960s.  However, it soon came to represent an alternative to the harmful effects of a 
liberalized coffee market, which sowed the seeds of its eventual focus on corporate firms.  When 
in 1989 the Agreement collapsed, due in part to U.S. commercial and foreign policy interests, the 
market was glutted and world coffee prices crashed, jeopardizing the livelihoods of 20 to 25 
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million farmer families, wreaking social and environmental damage, and dramatically reducing 
producing countries’ share of the coffee dollar (Oxfam America 2002; Talbot 2004).  Figure 2 
portrays the movement of both conventional and fair trade coffee prices since 1989.  Economic  
 
Figure 2: Conventional and Fair Trade Minimum Arabica Coffee Prices (Nominal), 
1988-2010 
 
 
Sources: ICE Futures 2010; FLO 2010 
 
power in the coffee industry is highly concentrated, with the “Big Five” transnationals—Nestlé, 
Kraft, Procter & Gamble, Sara Lee and Tchibo—controlling 69 percent of global roasted and  
ground coffee sales (Ponte 2002).  These traders reaped billions in additional profits during the 
1989-1994 period, and again during the more recent and severe price crash, which lasted from 
1999 to 2005 (Charveriat 2001; Oxfam International 2004).  During these twin crises, as Figure 2 
indicates, fair trade’s minimum or base prices paid to producer organizations for green 
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(unroasted) coffee—$1.26 per pound, and $1.41 for certified organic coffee—were well above 
the world price, as much as three times higher. 
 In 2000, during the most recent price crash, the U.S. fair trade movement began to focus 
on transnational coffee firms, a move that offered a window into the shifting relationship 
between SMOs, firms, and Transfair USA.  Global Exchange, an established human rights NGO, 
chose to target Starbucks, which was the largest specialty coffee roaster, although at the time still 
quite small in comparison with the Big Five.  After agreeing to Global Exchange’s demand to 
buy fair trade coffee, Starbucks entered into negotiations with Transfair USA, the new U.S. 
licensing initiative.  The two announced that Starbucks would make fair-trade coffee available in 
both whole-bean and brewed form at all of its U.S. stores, although the volume was left 
undefined (Starbucks and Transfair USA 2000).  In 2001, Starbucks purchased 653,000 pounds 
of certified coffee, and promised to buy one million pounds the following year (Starbucks 2001), 
well below one percent of its overall supply.  These developments, while a breakthrough for the 
movement’s visibility, generated angry responses from several long-time roasters who sold 
exclusively fair trade coffee.  They argued that the agreement violated norms that had required a 
minimum of five percent of a firm’s supply to be purchased at fair-trade terms in order to have 
the right to use the seal, and that it did not require Starbucks to increase its purchases over time:  
Transfair …purposely sidestepped the question of volume, of percentage commitment, in 
signing these guys up.  They’ve got to do that.  We’ve got to keep them working.  There 
has to be percentage advances every year, or else they should be penalized (Earley 2004) 
 
After Starbucks entered the fair trade market, several dozen regional and national 
specialty-coffee roasters, such as Green Mountain and Peet’s, followed suit.  Separately, a 
number of mass-market coffee firms, including Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee, were licensed 
by Transfair USA, but their sales volumes remained negligible.5  There was growing recognition 
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among movement activists that transnational firms brought a distinct set of motivations to their 
engagement with fair trade: 
You have companies like a Green Mountain or a Starbucks, or certainly Procter & 
Gamble, where many of them were kind of forced into doing fair trade, and so some of 
them are trying to see how little can we do and not get attacked; some of them are 
looking at, “well this can be a part of our social responsibility.” (Rosenthal 2005) 
 
In that same year, the licensing initiative in the U.K., the Fairtrade Foundation, 
announced that Nestlé—the world’s largest coffee trader and largest food corporation—would 
receive the fair trade seal for a small line of coffee titled Partner’s Blend.  The Foundation 
acknowledged that certifying the corporation, for two decades a target of consumer boycotts over 
its infant formula marketing practices, would antagonize many movement activists.  A Global 
Exchange campaigner summed up the concerns of NGOs that allowing Nestlé to use the seal 
“would make a mockery of the entire fair trade label, and [contradict] our history of resistance 
against the company for any number of other policies” (Guzzi 2005). Yet by 2008, fair trade still 
represented only 0.0025 percent of Nestlé’s total coffee volume (Tropical Commodity Coalition 
2009).  While Nestlé had promised to increase fair trade sales volumes over time, the Fairtrade 
Foundation’s deputy director acknowledged in 2010 that the firm had so far failed to do so: “we 
have got an agreement about continued increase, we’ve got targets, [but] they’re not legally 
enforceable” (Bretman 2010). 
 The greatest concern expressed by fair trade movement groups and many 100 percent fair 
trade companies is that without binding commitments to volume growth, large firms can utilize 
the fair trade seal to burnish their corporate images and mislead consumers about their overall 
business practices, without meaningfully altering those practices.  The potential of the fair trade 
label to serve as a vehicle for “fair-washing” (Renard 2005) in the fast-growing arena of 
corporate social responsibility claims is acknowledged by the licensing bodies. “I have no 
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blinders on about what these companies have done,” remarked the CEO of Transfair USA. “I just 
feel that if they’re willing to step up and reinvent themselves in real concrete terms, not in a 
token way, but in a significant way that’s going to affect the lives of tens or maybe even 
hundreds of thousands of workers, then that’s something I want to be open to …[But] we don’t 
want to be a PR device, or a greenwashing device, for anyone” (Rice 2005).   
This issue, among others, has highlighted the distinctions between two groups of fair 
trade retailers: on one hand a “mission-driven” group of small and medium companies, most of 
whom sell 100 percent fair trade products, and on the other hand corporate firms attracted by fair 
trade’s profitability as a small niche market.  This division has emerged as the key source of 
intra-movement tensions, particularly around specific tactical and strategic choices made by the 
licensing initiatives (Jaffee 2007).  A co-founder of Equal Exchange voiced these concerns:  
There are ways that the 100-percenters, the high-roaders, the mission-driven, whatever 
we call them, could have been used to incentivize, and provoke, and stimulate and 
motivate the corporate folks.  But instead it’s become an either-or game.  And the 100-
percenters have felt used, basically.  This corporate volume has been built on their backs, 
and they were disposable. (Rosenthal 2005)  
 
Because labeling is the key means of communicating fair trade claims, conferring the right to use 
the seal grants firms access to valuable branding real estate; for this reason, activists and 
mission-driven retailers argue that it should be conditioned upon meeting a high, and rising, bar. 
This controversy over corporate “dabblers” participating in fair trade at allegedly token 
levels reflects a deeper divergence between the competing models of social change within the 
movement.  The president of Cooperative Coffees, a coalition of 100-percent fair trade roasters, 
framed the issue as one of the integrity of fair trade standards: 
There’s some reasons that 100 percent fair traders ought to get behind these companies 
moving in, but we’ve got to understand what principles and regulations and rules [will 
apply], but we shouldn’t be looking at lowering standards in order to let them in…we 
Jaffee, “Weak Coffee” 
 
26 
should if anything use that as an opportunity to lift it, not come down closer to their 
normal standards. (Harris 2005) 
 
In addition to the contention over where to set the bar for corporate participation, two 
other policy issues have generated substantial controversy.  The first of these is the level of the 
minimum prices for certified goods, particularly coffee.  FLO sets the levels of the minimum 
prices and the development premium for each commodity, which are the key redistributive 
mechanisms in the system and constitute an integral part of fair trade standards.  The coffee floor 
prices were established in 1988 based on studies of production and living costs for farmer 
households.  However, they were never tied to inflation and remained virtually unchanged for 20 
years, rapidly losing purchasing power.  By 2008—even after FLO acceded to strong producer 
pressure and raised coffee prices marginally6—the base price had fallen by 41 percent in real 
terms, and would have needed to be $2.29 per pound to keep pace with inflation (Bacon 2010).  
Calo and Wise (2005: 40) assert that in Mexico, the fair trade price had lost 75 percent of its real 
value by 2005.  These stagnating price levels reflected a political stalemate between the interests 
of the larger commercial players in the certification system, and producer organizations’ desires 
to keep pace with rising costs.  Since the recent price crisis ended in 2005, coffee producer 
organizations have increasingly complained that even for those groups able to sell all of their 
export-grade coffee at fair trade prices, many of their members could not cover their costs of 
production (Bacon 2010; Jaffee 2007).  In 2011, however, faced with a dramatically higher 
world coffee market, FLO was obligated to raise prices and premiums in order to keep 
competitive with conventional intermediaries.  As of this writing, the effective fair-trade base 
prices are $1.60 per pound for conventional coffee and $1.90 for organic (FLO 2011a). 
 The second point of conflict involves the extension of fair trade standards and 
certification into an entirely new arena: waged laborers in plantation agriculture.  The “hired 
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labor modality” was originally intended as a minor adjunct for crops such as tea and bananas, 
which are produced both on estates and by smallholders, but where a reliable supply from the 
latter was not always available.  Increasingly since 2003, however, FLO and Transfair USA have 
expanded the range of products produced by agribusiness plantations, arguing that this represents 
an opportunity to change the behavior of large firms with historical reputations as “bad actors” 
(Frundt 2009; Goigoi 2008).  Certification of waged labor enterprises is based on a distinct set of 
criteria from the original small producer mode: employers must pay national minimum wages, 
workers have the right to organize (but the presence of independent unions is not guaranteed), 
and fair trade premiums are placed in a fund to be administered by a management-labor “joint 
body” for projects benefiting workers (Bahra 2009; Goigoi 2008).  The bulk of the growth in 
global fair trade sales now comes from the agricultural plantation sector, which as of 2010 
included 185 certified large enterprises employing a total of 128,000 workers (Raynolds 2010).  
Fair trade cut flowers, fresh and dried fruit, tea, sugar, cotton, and spices, among other products, 
are sourced largely or entirely from plantations and estates.  In 2009, Transfair licensed Dole, the 
top transnational banana producer, to place the fair trade seal on bananas and pineapples 
produced on plantations in Ecuador (The Packer 2009).  These developments are due in large 
part to the demand of retail grocery chains such as Whole Foods, Sam’s Club and Carrefour—
exemplars of buyer-driven commodity chains—for an increasing variety and volume of certified 
products (Conroy 2010).  However, recent media coverage of fair trade plantations has reported 
allegations that some workers on certified estates are paid below national minimum wages, that 
Transfair and Fairtrade Labeling Organizations are unable to monitor labor conditions 
effectively, that the joint bodies are controlled by management, and that unionization is virtually 
nonexistent (Bahra 2009; Goigoi 2008; International Labor Rights Forum 2010).    
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In contrast with independent labor monitoring of factory conditions by NGOs in the 
apparel sector, the expansion of agrifood fair trade certification into waged labor has been driven 
not by labor unions or other movement groups, but primarily by the demands of retailers, 
although international unions were involved in earlier efforts to develop fair-trade bananas 
(Frundt 2009).  Indeed, a key labor rights NGO expressed serious concern about FLO’s recent 
revision of its standards for hired labor.   The revised standards, the group alleges,  
would weaken enforcement, place more control into the hands of employers and would 
likely result in worse conditions for workers …The proposed changes appear to be 
deliberately weakening protections for workers in order to allow more employers into the 
system who do not currently respect workers. (International Labor Rights Forum 2010) 
 
The push by FLO to expand plantation agriculture soon generated substantial opposition from 
organizations of small coffee producers. “There was a struggle [over] whether we’re going to 
bring in plantations in coffee,” said an Equal Exchange co-founder.  “Well, we kind of won that 
one, at least…but it will take a very significant amount of organizing to have a chance to stop the 
lowering of standards. (Dickinson 2004) 
As a result of substantial lobbying within FLO by farmer groups and fair trade NGOs, 
four fair trade certified commodities—cocoa, coffee, honey, and cotton—remain for the moment 
limited to smallholder production only.  However, in September 2011, Transfair USA generated 
major controversy by announcing that it would leave the FLO system entirely, in order to create 
new independent standards that will permit unlimited certification of plantation-produced coffee 
and other crops (FLO 2011b).  This could permit large roasters such as Starbucks to become 100 
percent fair-trade certified without altering their supply chains.  
The strategy of market mainstreaming adopted by FLO and the licensing initiatives has 
proven quite effective at expanding both the supply of and demand for fair trade goods.  Sales 
have continued to rise despite the recession, and the global market for all certified fair trade 
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goods surpassed $5 billion in 2010.  FLO has developed standards and prices for almost 200 
products, and retailers sell over 27,000 items containing fair trade ingredients (Bretman 2010; 
FLO 2010).7  Several major companies in Europe, including Cadbury and Sainsbury’s, have 
substantially increased fair trade purchases of cocoa and fresh fruit (Tranchell 2010; Vidal 2007).  
Coffee remains the biggest fair-trade product, with U.S. sales reaching 108 million pounds in 
2009 and in 2010, as Figure 1 indicates (Fair Trade USA 2011).  A significant proportion of this 
growth was due to purchases by large firms.  While Nestlé and J.M. Smuckers continue to buy 
only token quantities, Starbucks’ fair trade coffee purchases had risen by 2009 to 39 million 
pounds, making it the largest buyer of certified beans worldwide (Starbucks 2010).   
For many of the mission-driven companies, on the other hand, the mainstreaming  
strategy has proven more problematic.  An indicator of their disaffection is the fact that by 2010, 
the majority of the 100-percent fair trade retailers in the U.S. had left the FLO/Transfair system, 
with many of these shifting to a new certification system, “Fair for Life,” established by the 
organic certifier IMO (Equal Exchange 2010).  Looking toward the future, the movement-
aligned fair trade companies express a mix of appreciation for the benefits generated by fair 
trade’s growth and apprehension about the effects of transnational firms’ entry into the system.  
“We’ve forced multinationals to start playing this game to some extent,” argued Equal 
Exchange’s co-founder.  “I’m proud of that.  On the other hand, when I see what the impact of 
the multinationals is going to be, and when I see how the social movement in the US that now 
does kind of follow fair trade in some way, how they are indirectly being influenced by 
multinationals’ agendas, that’s pretty disconcerting” (Dickinson 2004). 
After having explored the fair trade movement’s trajectory and its growing interaction 
with large corporate firms, in the following section I assess the implications of this case study, 
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both in terms of the nature and degree of social movement cooptation, and the challenges facing 
SMOs that utilize certification as a primary tool to effect social change.   
Assessing Cooptation, Standards Dilution, and Movement Responses 
 
Trumpy defines cooptation as “the ability of a corporate target to bring the interests of a 
challenging group into alignment with its own goals” (2008: 480).  Corporate firms can employ a 
range of approaches to defuse the threats that regulation—even in the form of private, voluntary 
product certification—would represent to their commercial practices and profit margins, if based 
on high standards and rigorously enforced.  Analyzing these strategies can offer useful insights 
into the nature of social movement cooptation in the certification realm.  Firms that choose to 
engage with such regulatory regimes have a structural interest in rewriting the “rules of the 
game” in ways that allow them to maximize the public-relations benefits of the seal, but permit 
them to continue existing sourcing, labor, pricing, distribution, and retailing practices, and to 
maintain or increase profit margins.  Thus, pressure from corporate participants to lower the 
standards bar should be expected.  “Firms typically prefer weaker commitments with minimal 
enforcement,” writes Bartley (2007b: 311), “while social movements prefer stronger, binding 
standards.”  The relevant question, then, is whether the regulatory body is capable of 
withstanding such pressures and maintaining high standards, forcing firms to make real changes 
that advance key movement principles.  “Gaining new advantages,” writes Trumpy (2008: 488),  
is what distinguishes cooptation from corporate reform or compromise.  In the former 
outcome, the formal authority retains the power and is able to dissolve its relationship 
with the co-opted party at anytime, and presumably will do so as soon as this partnership 
is no longer in its interest.  In the latter outcomes, the challenging group is able to acquire 
some of this power and has actual influence over the formal authority.  
 
Do FLO and the licensing initiatives have “actual influence” over the corporations they 
license, have those firms instead rendered the regulatory mechanism toothless (Fridell, Hudson, 
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and Hudson 2008; Renard 2003), or does the outcome lie somewhere between these two poles?  
A brief review of two key fair trade policy developments is helpful in assessing which 
description is most accurate.  The minimum purchase level required for firms’ entry into the 
system was among the earliest points of contention.  The deal between Starbucks and Transfair 
USA effectively set this bar to entry at less than one percent of supply; other large roasters 
followed the company’s lead, but entered at even lower volumes.  The biggest of these 
transnationals—including Nestlé and J.M. Smuckers—remain well below one percent several 
years later.  A second instance is the growth of the hired labor segment of the market, involving a 
substantial increase in certification of plantations.  The move to increase lenience and flexibility 
for employers under these standards, labor advocates argue, speak to the strong pressure on FLO 
from retailers to qualify more agribusiness growers for the fair trade seal.  Yet fair trade officials 
contest that interpretation.  "The notion that the standards have been lowered is ill-informed," 
says the CEO of Transfair USA. "Our objective is to help the poor, whether they own a plot of 
land or not" (quoted in Goigoi 2008).  However, Transfair USA’s 2011 decision to break from 
the FLO system entirely and open certification to all plantation products appears to lend further 
credibility to the charges of standards weakening by producer and labor groups.  The expansion 
of hired labor production is seen as a positive development by those participants with a more 
reformist orientation, because companies are required to adhere to marginally higher standards—
although these often simply entail respecting, rather than flouting, national labor laws.  Those 
fair trade participants invested in a more transformational model of fair trade, on the other hand, 
see these developments as problematic, arguing that such engagement “can go a long way to 
polishing even the worst corporate image” (North 2008).  
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Taken together, the outcomes of the various controversies in the fair trade policy arena 
can best be characterized as a dilution of standards.  The agents of this dilution are both the large 
firms exerting pressure to modify the standards, and the certification and licensing bodies that 
have often acceded to this pressure.  While there are some elements of compromise (such as the 
issue of minimum price levels), in most areas the clear trend is toward a lowering of the bar, 
permitting the inclusion of actors, production forms, and commercial practices that would have 
been non-conforming under previous versions of the standards.  This indicates that corporate 
firms have largely succeeded in bringing the interests of fair trade certification leaders “into 
alignment” with their goals (Trumpy 2008: 480).  In the realm of tactics, the certifier and the 
licensing bodies have clearly favored institutional approaches, stressing access and negotiation 
over maintaining a high bar for entry—a phenomenon especially pronounced in the U.S. case.  
Evaluating whether fair trade has achieved new advantages, of course, hinges on the definition of 
such advantages.  FLO and Transfair have defined volume growth as the key metric of success, 
but if new advantages are understood to entail “actual control” over corporate firms, as Trumpy 
insists, then it is reasonable to conclude that FLO and Transfair have not achieved such control.   
A related issue is the question of who or what constitutes the fair trade movement, and 
who speaks or acts on its behalf.  As the market has grown, there has been an increasing 
semantic conflation of fair trade SMOs with the certification and licensing bodies and the seal 
itself—that is, the fair trade system.  While the difference between movement and system is 
clearly important, it has become blurred.8  FLO and the national licensing initiatives have gained 
substantial power as the system has grown through its embrace of institutional approaches, 
conventional market actors, and agribusiness production.  To date, social movement groups have 
failed to voice a clear alternative posture or mount a coherent challenge to these policies from 
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within the system.  “If a movement’s leaders are largely autonomous,” argues Trumpy (2008: 
483), “leaders are able to control the organization without the consensus of rank and file 
members.”  While the governance structures of the licensing initiatives in most countries are 
fairly representative of the range of constituencies within their respective fair trade movements, 
thus reducing their freedom to act autonomously, Transfair USA is a notable exception.  The 
founder of a movement-aligned coffee roaster that left the certification system argued that the US 
licensing body is “not the movement, and I think that somewhere along the line, folks at 
Transfair, and folks outside Transfair, sort of forgot that” (Earley 2004). 
This “working misunderstanding”— a glossing-over of the distinction between the 
certification system and the movement itself—has arguably facilitated cooptation, as Transfair 
and FLO have been able establish precedents for corporate participation that will be difficult for 
the mission-oriented groups to reverse.  “Our experience in the U.S.,” said a co-founder of Equal 
Exchange, “was that the [fair trade] brand was handed over, but somehow there was no 
accountability built in back to these original folks or the movement…Somehow we lost power, 
we lost the accountability of our brand” (Rosenthal 2010). 
These tensions between what some activists term the “deep” and “shallow” approaches to 
fair trade also illustrate the importance of the nature of the commodity chains that social 
movements aim to regulate.  The trading chains within the fair trade system have shifted since its 
inception from shorter, alternative or “relational” linkages characterized by smallholder 
agriculture, long-term commercial relationships and movement-oriented retailers, toward longer, 
conventional or “captive” chains marked by vertically integrated transnational firms, waged 
labor, and agribusiness plantations, and also toward the “buyer-driven” chains controlled by 
retailers (Brown and Getz 2008; Mutersbaugh 2005a; Raynolds and Wilkinson 2007).  This 
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dynamic also reflects the increasing power of large firms, rather than SMOs, to influence the 
direction of the fair trade system, a phenomenon Mutersbaugh (2005a: 2035) describes as a 
“corporate social movement” against the restrictions to capital posed by stringent standards.   
By prioritizing access over new advantages—or by redefining “new advantages” as 
merely an increase in sales—the most powerful actors in the fair trade system have achieved 
dramatic success in terms of growth, but at the cost of rendering fair trade primarily an adjunct to 
the conventional market, rather than posing a fundamental challenge to the terms on which it 
operates.  For social movements whose principal tool for effecting social change is voluntary 
certification, then, cooptation is most likely to occur in the arena of the effectiveness, integrity, 
and/or rigor of standards.  And the form that cooptation takes is likely to be the dilution of the 
content of those standards, upon which the certification rests.    
Some observers have characterized certification (and certification-like approaches such 
as independent labor monitoring) as a force for greater corporate accountability because it offers 
firms a more palatable alternative to tactics such as boycotts or “naming and shaming” 
approaches (Bartley 2007b; Fung, O'Rourke, and Sabel 2001; Seidman 2007).  However, fair 
trade groups have only employed such confrontational tactics in a very few instances, notably the 
Starbucks case, and this approach has largely been abandoned in favor of negotiation between 
certifiers and corporations, leaving SMOs largely on the sidelines.  Yet some scholars observe 
that without the “stick” of confrontational tactics, the “carrot” of certification has proven 
ineffectual in transforming corporate practices (Fridell, Hudson, and Hudson 2008; Jaffee 2007).  
By empowering professional certifiers rather than SMOs to establish and negotiate the content of 
standards, the use of certification as a primary social movement tactic increases the potential for 
cooptation and dilution, in the absence of strong safeguards.  It is also likely to alter social 
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movement ecology, as it has in the case of fair trade, by shifting power away from activists to 
administrators and firms—that is, from the movement to the system and the market.   
Conclusions 
 
In this article, I have made two main arguments regarding the nature of cooptation in 
social movements that engage with corporations primarily through the tactics of labeling and 
certification.  First, for SMOs that employ certification as the principal tool in their efforts to 
effect social change, the central feature of cooptation is that it occurs primarily on the terrain of 
the standards undergirding certification.  Second, this analysis of the case of the fair trade 
movement illustrates the unique shape taken by cooptation in the context of voluntary product 
certification: dilution or weakening of the standards on which the certification is based, allowing 
previously non-complying firms and behaviors to qualify.   
This article has extended upon previous scholarship on social movement outcomes by 
linking it to the literatures on private regulation, certification, and global commodity chains, as 
well as market embeddedness.  I have contrasted fair trade with other cases of cooptation in 
social movement that have engaged corporate actors, drawing a key distinction between SMOs 
that employ corporate campaigning tactics (such as movements opposing genetically modified 
foods or firms’ contributions to climate change) and those using market-centered approaches.  
For social movement theory, these insights demonstrate the need for greater conceptual clarity 
regarding the ways that movements utilize (and are transformed by the use of) tactics such as 
voluntary product certification.  They argue for a broader understanding of the specific processes 
and tactics by which corporations are able to coopt SMOs’ transformative potential on this 
relatively new and highly contested terrain.  The case of fair trade also demonstrates the need to 
consider two less-theorized elements of industry structures— the nature of firms’ global 
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commodity chains, and the use of nonstate regulatory forms such as product certification—in 
analyzing the opportunities and constraints facing social movements that focus on corporations.   
Conversely, the article departs from previous scholarship on certification and standards 
by focusing upon cooptation as a central theme, and by grounding this study in an empirical 
examination of the fair trade movement’s changing relationship with corporate agrifood firms 
over the past decade, which is reflected in the shifting content of standards.  Certification is 
sometimes framed as an adjunct to corporate campaigns, providing a “carrot” to accompany the 
“stick” of boycotts and protests in sectors marked by social and environmental abuses (Seidman 
2007; Taylor 2005a).  Close attention to the nature of these standards and how they change over 
time—their form, specific content, consistency, rigor, degree of autonomy, governance 
structures, and enforcement—is important for understanding the dynamics of cooptation in such 
contexts.  What may appear as intra-movement policy debates over the content of standards, for 
example, may instead be the actual process of cooptation unfolding.  
For fair trade activists, the blurred identity of fair trade as both social movement and 
certification system illustrates the major challenges facing SMOs that operate primarily in this 
arena.  The conflation of the certification system with the entire movement has allowed FLO and 
licensing initiatives such as Transfair USA to speak and act for that movement.  This is possible 
because of their size and power relative to movement NGOs, as well as their ability to create 
“facts on the ground” by licensing large corporate firms at terms that create a low bar to entry.  
Under such circumstances, the semantic and practical significance of the fair trade label becomes 
challenging to pin down.  Presently, transnationals can receive fair trade certification for their 
own captive, often vertically-integrated supply chains, without making substantive changes to 
them.  Aside from stipulating payment of a base price to farmers or the minimum wage to 
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laborers, certifying such chains does not render them meaningfully more relational or socially 
embedded, while it further disembeds the seal itself.  At the same time, this analysis also 
suggests a potential outline of routes for those actors who seek to reassert the original 
transformative character of the movement from within.  The recent creation of the Fair World 
Project, an NGO founded by Global Exchange and the Organic Consumers Association to 
organize consumers to protect and restore the integrity of fair trade (and organic) standards, is an 
intriguing move in this direction (Fair World Project 2010).   
On a broader level, the fair trade case demonstrates that private regulation by civil society 
groups and SMOs—via tools such as certification and standards—is an approach fraught with 
serious limitations.  Because of the voluntary nature of these market mechanisms and the lack of 
safeguards against token participation, they are susceptible to cooptation and dilution by the 
large economic interests whose behavior they are designed to reign in.  More generally, it 
highlights the substantial problems with the use of market-based mechanisms as a path to re-
embedding international economic exchange into a framework of moral and social relations as 
envisioned by Polanyi.  Indeed, the fair trade case can be read as a cautionary tale about the 
limits of voluntary, nonstate regulation, and the risks for social movements of embracing the 
narrower, less accountable realm of the market as the locus of change.  It indicates the need for 
SMOs to consider alternative frameworks for re-regulation of global corporations, for example 
incorporating binding minimum social and environmental standards into international trade 
agreements or other suprastate institutions.  Taking such a route would, perhaps ironically, entail 
social movements turning their efforts back to the state after all.   
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NOTES: 
1  Many observers challenge claims that neoliberal globalization has weakened nation-states, 
arguing they have been profoundly reconfigured rather than eviscerated, while nonetheless 
acknowledging the greatly increased power of TNCs (e.g., McMichael 2010; Sassen 1996). 
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2  While most third-party certifications are created by NGOs, they can also have a state locus.    
   The USDA organic standards are a prime example of civil society-generated certification being  
   supplanted by governmental oversight.  
3  Nevertheless, some scholars of fair trade view this shift in the locus of SMO energies as 
problematic, arguing that the nature of the claims civil society can make upon corporate actors 
is far more limited than the kinds of demands citizens are able to make on even severely 
constrained states (e.g., Fridell 2007b; Jaffee 2007).   
4  In late 2010, Transfair USA changed its name in to Fair Trade USA, and FLO became Fair 
Trade International.  I use the former names throughout this paper to retain consistency with 
the interview quotes. 
5  Procter & Gamble introduced one fair-trade certified coffee as part of its specialty Millstone       
brand in 2004.  J.M. Smuckers purchased P&G’s entire coffee division in 2008.  As of that 
year, fair-trade coffee represented 0.5 percent of the firm’s total coffee volume (Tropical 
Commodity Coalition 2009).  Sara Lee has since stopped selling fair-trade coffee entirely.   
6  The 2007-08 FLO increases raised the base price for conventional green coffee (paid to farmer 
organizations) from $1.26 per pound to $1.35, and the price for certified organic coffee from 
$1.41 to $1.55 per pound.  
7  These figures exclude sales of fair-trade crafts and artisanal goods, for which FLO has yet to 
develop formal certification or standards.   In 2010, however, FLO and Transfair USA began to 
certify fair trade cotton clothing.  
8  Fridell (2007) also addresses the tensions between what he terms the fair trade “system” and 
the fair trade “network,” or social movement.  
